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NO BEING, NO SINGULARITY. HEGEL’S CRITIQUE OF SENSE-CERTAINTY IN 
THE »PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT«
It has always been a matter of great dispute what Hegel’s philosophy is about. There is not even an agree­
ment on what he is driving at; we simply don’t know what he was talking about. To some he is a strict meta­
physician with claims to ultimate justification and truth, to others he is more or less a cultural relativist. But 
almost all relevant books and papers discuss Hegel’s philosophy in general terms; very few have tried a de­
tailed tme-to-the-text exegesis.1
I will suggest such a close reading of Hegel’s very first dialectical move in the Chapter on Sense-Cer­
tainty in the Phenomenology 7- It is undisputed that there are three types of sense certainty (SC): For the first 
sense certainty (SCI), the object is the truth; for the second (SC2) it is the I, and for the third (SC3) the 
whole process of pointing. Here I will deal only with SCI, and in fact consider only one >shape< it assumes, 
namely that of the >Now<3
How is the Chapter on Sense Certainty structured?
In the first two paragraphs, Hegel describes sense certainty in general terms, without regard to the distinction 
between SCI, SC2 and SC3, or rather: SC and then SCI describe themselves. That is necessary, for in ac­
cordance with his indirect method, Hegel must refer to the standard belonging to his object. This general 
self-characterization of SC in § 91 begins with the following: »It [SC] asserts about that which it knows, 
only this: ...«(§ 91; 69,20); after the colon comes what SC asserts (namely, »it is«). SC >asserts about what 
it knows only this< -  that is a formulation worthy of note. For Hegel does not write »Sense certainty knows 
the following...« or »The knowing in which sense certainty consists is the following...«, or anything like 
that. Rather, Hegel refers to what SC >asserts about what it knows« By what SC knows, is meant the »con­
crete content« (§ 91; 69, 10) of a sense certainty. In this sense, Hegel is referring already in the next para­
graph to »an actual sense certainty« (§ 92; 70, 9; my italics), thus for instance to the certainty of night, of a 
tree, etc. >Of< that, hence about that, or with reference to that >which it knows< SC therefore asserts some­
thing.
The principal assertion by SC about what it knows is: »it is« (§91; 69,21). Hegel explicates this fur­
ther: »and its truth contains only the being of the thing« (§ 91; 69, 21); a few lines later this assertion is re­
peated: »the thing is, and it is only because it is-, it is, this is the most essential thing to sense certainty, and 
this pure being or this simple immediacy constitutes its truth« (§ 91; 69,35). As occurred already in the first 
paragraph (§ 90; 69,5), this pure being is identified with the immediate. What is, is thus something immedi­
ate, or as it is also said, something singular. It is exceedingly important in understanding SC, that the unme­
diated object which is, is understood in its unmediatedness as the absolutely singular (§ 110; 77, 27; 78, 4). 
Sense certainty understands that which it comprehends as the true »as actual, absolutely singular, wholly 
personal, individual things, each of which no longer has anything else that is absolutely like it« (§ 110; 77, 
27); that is what it says o f the object. Hence one must understand SC as a nominalistic position: For it, what 
is is always and exclusively an individual being that does not fall under general categories. Accordingly, the 
main assertion of SC is twofold:
1. SC asserts about whatever object it takes up that it is; let us call that its being thesis.
2. SC asserts about .whatever it counts as the essential, that it is something absolutely singular about which 
nothing general can be expressed, and which also in no way participates in anything general or univer­
sal; let us call that its singularity thesis.
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The argumentative structure of the Chapter on Sense Certainty consists in Hegel’s refutation o f the being 
thesis and the singularity thesis for all three variants o f SC. Hegel thus shows for SCI, SC2 and SC3 that 
the object, as it is asserted by SC (that is, as absolutely singular), is not; and that the object of SC is rather 
universal (mediated), and is not absolutely singular.4
D etailed analysis o f  SC I
In §§ 95 und 96, Hegel follows the method described in the Introduction. The individual steps of this testing 
process are easy to recognize:
1) SCI is asked what the >This< it has asserted is. Since this >This< has a twofold >shape< (the >Now< and 
the >Here<), the initial form of the decisive question is: >What is the Now?<
2) SCI answers with the sentence: >The Now is night.<
3) This sentence is written down and preserved.
4) At a later point in time (noon), this sentence is looked at again.
5) From this looking at the sentence again, Hegel infers that the truth asserted in it has >become stale<.
Now let us go through these steps individually.
A d i )  SC itself has asserted something >about that which it knows< (§ 91; 69,21), essentially this: that 
its object is a »pure This< (§ 91; 69,25; 70,4). The introduction of the expression >pure This< in § 91 is not 
justified. But naturally the issue is what essentially constitutes SCI: the presence of something that refers to 
a subject by means of its sense. Since the >This< was identified with the >singular< (§ 91; 70,4—5) (this also 
without any further justification), the first question, what the >This< is, can also be stated as >What is the sin- 
gular?< Since the issue is sense certainty and the sense refers to objects in space and time, the >This< has a 
double >shape< or >form<. The singular that is temporally present is called by SCI >Now< (and correspond­
ingly, the singular spatially present, >Here<). The question what the >This< is or what the >singular<, or in fact 
what the >Now< is, thus demands the explication of an expression that SCI itself uses. The phenomenologist 
seeks an explication of what SCI expresses [or asserts] about what it knows<.
Ad 2) The phenomenologist does not seek to know, what night (or day, etc.) is. She seeks to know what 
it is that SCI says >of< its current object, namely, that it is a This. To the question, what the Now is, the an­
swer is:
(1) The Now is night.
Since it is said that the answer (night) is an >example<, and since in the case of the answer to the parallel 
question about what the Here is, the answer even is that >The Here is for example the tree< (§ 98; 72,7), 
apparently one may formulate it accordingly as:
(2) The Now is, for example, night.
Yet if night is an example of the Now, then there are also other examples of the Now, and then night is 
precisely one Now, and another Now is day, and so on. Hence whoever says (2) can also say:
(3) One Now is night.
Yet with this we arrive, so to speak, too quickly at the result. For if SCI really gave (3) as its answer, then it 
would have to say also: One (other) Now is noon. Then, however, there would be several Nows, so that the 
current Nows could be ordered to a universal Now -  and that, as we will see more precisely, is Hegel’s chief 
critical point. Thus instead of understanding (1) and the talk about >examples< in the sense of (2) or (3), we 
have to think of a situation in which the phenomenologist asks SCI what the Now is and SCI answers, at 
this point in time, when it is night, with (1). The foundation of the knowledge of SCI is the sensibly given 
presence of something. If it speaks of night, then it refers in fact to a night that is sensibly given, now or 
then. The phenomenologist reports a conversation with SCI and reports that a typical answer by SCI is for 
example >The Now is night<. The characterization of (1) as an >example< is not a mere reproduction of the 
self-understanding of SCI regarding its answer. Thus (1) is not to be understood as if SCI said (1) and 
meant (2) or (3); (1) is an example only for the phenomenologist who reports this answer and understands it 
as an example.
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It is moreover no accident that Hegel says about the universal in § 96 (71,26) that it »is indifferent over 
against what is beside it«, thus for instance indifferent over against night. For Hegel an >example< is some­
thing >alongside<.5 In this sense, in the Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, the term >example< 
(Beispiel) is directly elucidated through the expression >play beside< (Beiherspielen). »Here an intuition, rep­
resentation or determination of thought is demanded, an example [Beispiel], something playing alongside 
[Beiherspielendes] of the content, which was previously given only in thought.« In the edition of this lecture 
by Hotho, it says: »Yet in the word >example< [Beispiel], externality is already recognized as only >playing 
alongside< [beiher Spielendes], but the pure thought is recognized as what is substantial« (both passages 
VPR, 35, my emphasis). Thus the night is, as Hegel also says, what >plays alongside< (das Beiherspielende) 
of the >Now itself<, or precisely an example of it. But if an example, as Kant says, >is only the particular, rep­
resented as contained under the universal according to concepts<,6 then the singular is not an absolutely sin­
gular, but also something universal; yet, as we said, there will be more presently about this chief argument.
SCI avoids (3) and hence the indefinite article (a Now). The definite article (the Now) should make 
clear that (1) is a singular, non-tautological assertion of identity. If one takes account of what SC says >about 
that which it knows< -  thus for example about night -  then one can understand the term >Now< in (1) as a 
something sensibly present, absolutely singular that is in time.< From that we get (1*):
The sensibly present, absolutely singular being in time is night.
It will presently become even clearer that >Now< in >the Now<, is not an indexical term.
Ad 3) In the Introduction Hegel »reminds us«, as he says (§ 82; 64,10), of the determinations of the 
concepts of truth and knowing. Truth is accordingly that which is in itself, the object which is outside any 
relation of knowing. This seems to fit SCI particularly well. For SCI the object is indeed its truth, and this 
object is that thing that is itself, it »remains even when it is not known« (§ 93; 70,33).
Although these >recollected< determinations of >truth< and >knowledge< seem at first to fit SCI, the ac­
tual use of the term >truth< in Hegel’s >truth test< is a different one. For when Hegel says that he wants to 
>write down< >this truth< so as to test it, then he is using the demonstrative pronoun >this< to refer to the as­
sertion (1): >The Now is night<. What is tested, therefore, is an assertion and its possible >truth<. In the con­
text of the truth test, >truth< refers not to the object that is in itself, but to an assertion about it. (Obviously 
that is much more plausible and natural, since one can write down an assertion about an object, but not the 
object.) But that does not mean that Hegel is speaking of >truth< in a sense that does not correspond to the 
self-positioning of SCI. For night, as something that is in itself, is indeed the truth of SC I. But it refers to 
this object through a sentence that it takes to be true, and that it is true means, in the correspondence-theoretic 
sense, that there is something in the world corresponding to this sentence; in any case, the relation between 
knowledge and truth (understood as an object) is obviously understood in this sense.
Ad 4) At first glance we right away get the crucial point involved in this truth test: Sentence (1), ex­
pressed at a determinate point in time t,, is false when expressed again (or rather read) at a later point in time 
tj, when it is noon rather than night (where it is naturally presupposed that the sentence itself makes no as­
sertion about the point in time at which it is expressed). -  But the matter shows itself to be more difficult. 
First we have to see that in the context of SCI, >Now< is applied in three different ways; then we can get to 
the bottom of the genuine truth test.
(i) The most obvious application of >Now<, the one with which we are all familiar, is the indexical: We 
apply the term >Now< (or rather: >now<) in order to refer in a context dependent fashion to a present an inter­
val of time, of greater or lesser magnitude. Here the object of reference can change depending on the context 
(let us call this indexical meaning of >Now< >NoWj<.). The truth test that Hegel carries out can work only if 
>Now< in the formulation >Now, this noon< (§ 95; 71,12) is applied -  contrary to the confusing nominaliza- 
tion of the word -  in this indexical sense.
(ii) A second application of >Now< results from Hegel’s reflections on the >universal< in § 96; let us call 
this the categorial application. More precisely, Hegel speaks here of the >Now itselfc (§96; 71, 18; corre­
spondingly, he speaks a bit later of the >Here itself< § 98). It would be tempting, but false, to believe that this 
>Now itself< is nothing different from the indexical expression >NoWj<. For the issue about the >Now itself< 
(for short, >Nows<) is not merely a linguistic form, but about a being, something that is. We can see this in 
several ways.
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First, the >Nows< signifies something that endures (etwas >bleibendes<) (§ 96; 71, 23) or that preserves 
itself< (§ 96; 71, 18), and indeed it >preserves< itself as distinct from >night<. For >the Now which is night< 
(§ 96; 71,15) which is given out by SCI as >abeing< and yet shows itself to be >not a being< (§ 96; 71, 17), 
is the Nows, even in contrast to that Now >which is night<, something that is.
Second, Hegel understands Nowsas universal as the (new) >truth< of SCI (§ 96; 71,32). But this >truth< 
of SCI is something that is, even when it is not known. Hence after concluding the first dialectical move­
ment, it is said: »This sense certainty, insofar as in itself it shows the universal as the truth of its object, thus 
remains pure being as its essence...«(§ 99; 72,15).
In this sense, thirdly, the result of the first dialectical movement, both for Hegel and for SCI itself, is 
»the universal this; or: it is; that means, being in general« (§97; 71, 35) -  yet this >being in general< is 
Nows.
Fourthly, this thought is also clear through a change from Now, to Nows within Hegel’s argumentation 
in § 96. Hegel writes in § 96 (71,18-20) that >Now itself preserves itself over against the day that it Now is, 
as something that is also not day<. That is intelligible only if >Now itself< and >Now< are distinct, namely as 
Now, and Nows. But then one must read this as: >Nows preserves itself over against the day that it (thus 
Nows) is Now,, as such a Nows, that is also not day<. Through the linguistic for Now, we refer to a present, 
singular interval of time of greater or lesser magnitude (e. g. the night), which as such in a limited sense is, 
and indeed, according to Hegel, falls under a universal being, thus under Nows.
(iii) We find the third application of >Now< in the question and answer from § 95: >What is the Now?< 
>The Now is night.< With a view to the fact that this Now is a form of the >This<, let us call this the individu­
alizing application (for short, >NowT<). The >night< that is present in the conversation of SCI at t, is, as 
something absolutely singular, identified by SCI with the >Now<. This is especially clear in the formulation 
from § 96: >The Now, which is night, ... is given out as a being< (71, 15). It is wholly obvious that in this 
passage >Now< is not understood as an indexical expression (as it was in § 95; 71,12), but rather as a desig­
nation for an absolutely individual object. But if in this passage (§ 96; 71,15) >Now< does not have an in- 
dexical signification, then it also cannot have this signification in (1), for >the Now, which is night< is pre­
cisely that >Now< in (1). >Now< signifies (out of the sight of SCI) in this passage, as in general in (1), a sen­
sibly present absolutely singular being in time, which >no longer has anything absolutely like itc the night 
(*1). The distinction between Now, and NowT consists in the fact that Now, can, and also should, refer to ar­
bitrarily many beings in time, while NowT can and should refer only to one such being, an absolutely singu­
lar one.
Ad 5) We said at the outset that SCI asserts two things >about that which it knows<. First, that its object 
is (the being thesis) and second that its object is something absolutely singular (the singularity thesis); and 
we have said further that Hegel (the phenomenologist) refutes both theses through the indirect method: First, 
the object that SC asserted to be is not; second, the object of SCI is not something absolutely singular, but a 
universal. Let us now consider these refutations somewhat more closely.
Refutation o f  the being thesis
The refutation of the being thesis results directly from the truth test. We can understand this more precisely 
in the following way: At time t, (thus at any time in which it is night) SCI asserts (1) or (*1). At time t, 
(thus at any later time at which it is noon), SCI asserts
(4) The Now is noon, 
or in its reformulation,
(4*) The sensibly present absolutely singular being in time is noon.
In (1*) and (4*), SCI identifes NowT as at one time night, at another time noon; since these are assertions of 
identity, we are caught in a contradiction.
It is noteworthy here that Hegel does not at first call this a contradiction. Instead, at first he simply indi­
cates that when it is no longer night but noon, night no longer is: »The Now, which is night, is preserved -  
that means it is treated as that for which it has been given out, as a being, but it shows itself rather as a not-
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being« (§96; 71,15-18). SCI says of the night that it is, but thereby says at the same time that this is its 
truth, for the truth of SCI is indeed what has being in itself (das Ansichseiende). But if one is referring to 
>truth< as to the truth of a sentence -  as happens in the truth test - ,  then one could say that SCI asserts the 
truth of (1) in a correspondence-theoretic sense. What makes the sentence true is the object; if the object is 
not (or is no longer), then the sentence is not (or no longer) true. The being of the object of SCI disap­
pears^ as Hegel says several times: nothing corresponds to the truth of the sentence >Now is night<. That 
which could correspond would be the fact that it was night, but such facts are nothing sensibly given (at least 
they are nothing >in the world<, as Strawson might say).
That one could say the assertion (1) is no longer true, lies close at hand in the formulation that (1) or 
the truth of (1) >has become stale< (§ 95; 71,14); for what has >become stale< was perhaps at an earlier time 
not stale. But it would be strange if Hegel were to admit at time tt that (1) was true, for that’s what SCI itself 
gave out, at least at one time. But Hegel simply cannot say that night as Now in the sense of SCI has been. 
Rather the proponents of SCI must admit they are »speaking of a thing that is not« (§ 100; 77,40).
It is excluded that Hegel should admit the truth of (1) and thus the being of night at t1; because in the 
context of SC Hegel seems to make use of a concept of being that he neither explains further nor grounds in 
any way, but about which he seems to assume, and also has to assume, that SC shares it. According to this 
concept of being, only that is (is a being), which is constant. Hegel makes clear this idealistic concept of be­
ing with reference to SC3, but it holds just as much for SCI: »The Now, as it is pointed out to us is [or as it 
is written down, D.S.] is something that has been; and this is its truth; it does not have the truth of being. 
This is also therefore true, that it has been. But what has been is in fact not a being [or an essence, kein We- 
sen], it is not, and yet the issue was about being« (§ 106; 75, 4). It holds also for the night that it has been 
(so of it >being< has to be understood in a weakened sense); in any case it is no longer, and hence it never 
was a being. -  Hegel says no more about this. But two sections from the Lectures on the History o f Phi­
losophy confirm this reading. Thus in a passage about the Megarian Stilpo, to whose example of cabbage 
Hegel refers, it says: »The cabbage that is pointed to (sold) here, is not. For that cabbage was many thou­
sands of years ago; thus the cabbage is not this that is pointed out, i.e. only the universal is, while this cab­
bage is not« (Werke 535). Stilpo says »that the This is not at all [...], that only the universal is« (Werke 535, 
my emphasis). >Cabbage<, >human being<, >I<, etc. are always universal, and: »The universal is; but even the 
singular is only universal« (Werke 537, my emphasis). In the text already mentioned from the lectures on 
medieval philosophy Hegel designates directly with reference to his time (>with us todayc, >these days<) the 
position of SC as >realism<. This position asserts that »sensible things, as they are in their immediate exis­
tence, are something hue, substantial, so that genuine being can be ascribed to them, and idealism stands over 
against this abstractly as the representation that the sensible, as it shows itself immediately in its singularity 
to the senses, is not something true«. The thesis therefore says that the objects of SCI have no »genuine 
being, even though they are asserted as >beings<; only the universal has »true being« (Werke, 572, my em­
phasis).
Yet even if this ontological interpretation is held to be implausible, there cannot be any SCI and conse­
quently (1) also cannot be true. For as we shall now see, there is, secondly, no object at all such as SCI 
means (namely, the absolutely singular one); the object it means is not, hence for example the night as an ab­
solutely singular entity is not, and also never was.
Refutation o f  the singularity thesis
SCI asserts (*1) and also (*4). In this there lies a contradiction, because NowT cannot be both night and 
noon. SCI cannot reply to this that (*1) and (*4) cannot be true at the same time, but can be true at different 
times. For aside from the fact that no system of co-ordination for points in time can be at the disposal of SC, 
the two assertions claim about different objects (night, noon) that they are absolutely singular and yet also 
that both objects are each sensibly present absolutely singular beings in time. Thus in truth both objects have 
something in common, or, as Hegel says, there is here a universal. At the very end of the chapter he makes 
this main point strikingly clear: »If nothing more is said of something than that it is an actual thing, an ex­
ternal object, then it is only as the most universal of all, and thereby its likeness to everything is expressed as 
much as its distinctness. If I say a singular thing, then I say it just as rmick-as.iSiunethioii wholly universal,
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for everything is a singular thing« (§ 110; 78, 7). The absolutely singular that is asserted (meant) by SCI, 
therefore is not. For the absolutely singular that is meant, »which is called the inexpressible, [is] nothing 
other than the untrue, irrational, the merely meant [or opioned, Gemeinte]« (§ 110; 78,5).
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NOTES
1 On hermeneutical problems of reading philosophical texts cf. my »Textvergessenheit in der Philosophie­
historie«, in: Dieter Schönecker/Thomas Zwenger (eds.): Kant verstehen/Understanding Kant. Über die 
Interpretation philosophischer Texte, Darmstadt 2001, 159-181.
2 Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes is cited according to the new edition published by Hans-Friedrich 
Wessels and Heinrich Clairmont with an introduction by Wolfgang Bonsiepen, 1988. The numbering o f 
the paragraphs refers to Miller’s English translation, the page and line numbers to the Meiner edition. I 
also use the following abbreviations:
VGP: Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie. Teil 4. Philosophie des Mittelalters und der 
neueren Zeit. Herausgegeben von Pierre Garniron und Walter Jaeschke, Hamburg 1986.
VPR: Einleitung in die Philosophie der Religion. Teil 1. Der Begriff der Religion. Neu herausgegeben 
von Walter Jaeschke, Hamburg 1993.
Werke: G.W.F. HEGEL: Werke. Auf der Grundlage der Werke von 1832-1845 neu edierte Ausgabe. Re­
daktion Eva Moldenhauer und Karl Markus Michael, Frankfurt/M. 1971, Vol. 19.
3 A much longer and detailed version of this paper has appeared in Internationales Jahrbuch des 
Deutschen Idealismus /  International Yearbook o f German Idealism, 1, 2003, 241-269.
4 We see this besides in Hegel’s Lectures on the History o f Philosophy. There Hegel briefly goes into the 
so-called >universals< controversy, and makes the illuminating observation that in his time the term >real- 
ism< means what was signified by >nominalism< in the middle ages, and what Hegel and his time under­
stand by >realism< is unambiguously the position of sense certainty; cf. VGP, 40 f. and Werke, Vol. 19, 
572.
5 Cf. § 92, 70, 10; § 93 ,70 , 21; § 9 5 ,7 1 ,7 ; § 96 ,71 , 26; § 102,73, 18. Note that it is very difficult to render 
the meaning of >beiherspielen< in English as well as the play on words between >Beispiel< and >beiher- 
spielen<.
6 Cf. Kant, Metaphysics o f Morals, Ak 6: 479f note.
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